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Contract Curses: Do Long Term Guaranteed Contracts Affect Player




The aim of this paper is to examine whether or not the “contract curse” (the idea
that during contract years, players will purposefully perform at a higher rate in order to
sign a bigger contract and then upon receiving these guaranteed salaries may vary their
effort level over the course of the contract cycle) is a viable worry in professional sports
leagues, and to what extent would contracts affect the stability of player performance.
The research will specifically focus on the salaries of professional athletes within the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL). Beyond just comparing the productivity of NHL players
before and after their given contracts, this paper will also attempt to predict the future
performance of players given their current contract and performance information, and
propose more accurate contract agreements in order to maximize player productivity.
Key words: player-agent problem; shirking; National Hockey League
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1 Introduction
Within the principal-agent models present in most organizations, inefficiencies may arise
from the creation of long-term contract agreements. Knowing that their future wages are
guaranteed, workers have an incentive to participate in opportunistic or strategic behavior,
generally referred to as shirking behavior (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Holmstrom 1979). The
moral hazard problem leading to the occurrence of shirking behavior results from asymmetric
information between the parties involved. In general, opportunistic behavior may occur
under the following conditions:
1. When the principal and the agent enter into a binding, long-term contract, through
which the agent is compensated by the principal for expending effort at some cost to
himself.
2. When the principal’s level of utility or profit is a function of the agent’s level of effort
expended.
3. When the principal is unable to monitor the effort of the agent directly.
In the context of this paper, the principal is the National Hockey League (NHL), and the
players are assigned the roles of agents. Under these conditions, a certain player may decide
that he has sufficient incentive to strategically vary his effort level. This paper will examine
the question of whether this type of strategic behavior exists specifically in the context of
long-term guaranteed contracts in the NHL, specifically focusing on the idea of the “contract
curse”.
The “contract curse” is the thought that during contract years, players will purposefully
perform at a higher rate in order to sign a bigger contract. However, upon receiving these
guaranteed salaries, players may feel the incentive to vary their effort level over the course of
the contract cycle. This effect has been covered in other leagues including the NBA, MLS,
and NFL, but not in the NHL. Hockey is a more team-oriented sport than the others listed.
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For example, the individual performance of a star player like LeBron James or Tom Brady
can single-handedly determine the overall team performance, whereas it is possible the same
effort might not cause as much of an impact in a hockey match. There is also the tricky
situation of positional importance in hockey; for example, a goalie would be attributed to a
greater level of importance than a defensemen in certain situations, which might affect their
shirking quantities. While prior research in this field suggests that while increased effort can
be noticed during seasons prior to long-term, guaranteed contracts, shirking behavior is not
observed afterwards in these other major sports. It would be interesting to see if the same
holds true in a more team-oriented sport like hockey. Additional discussion of this can be
found in the paper.
Further research on the topic of player productivity would not only be beneficial for
hockey analysis, but there are many other applications in the field of labor economics.
Strategic behavior as a result of long-term guaranteed contracts carries significant real-world
implications, such as manufacturing sales, political decisions, nuclear power plants, and even
the academic institution of tenure. The field of sports economics is useful as it allows for
access to worker productivity that is not as easily observable in other scenarios. My findings
also have the potential to benefit future NHL teams in their player evaluation process, as it
allows them to more accurately measure and maximize player productivity.
Using Points per Game as a measure of player performance, I found that the concern of
the existence of a contract curse might be entirely undue, and the phenomenon does not exist
using data sets with more recent observations from the past decade in the NHL. Additionally,
in the course of this study, I develop a method for separating the interrelated effects of age
and experience on player productivity by measuring experience in such a way that it is no
longer perfectly correlated with the passage of time.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 will give an overview of the
data set used, detailing both the player performance data as well as the contract data. Section
3 consists of the existing body of literature regarding principal agent problems in both the
4
NHL and other sports. It will also discuss the relevance of this paper and its contribution
to the current research. Section 4 will describe the economic theory of shirking and its
implications for my theoretical model analysis. Section 5 will establish my empirical model,
and any specifications of the variables included. Section 6 will summarize the results and
will finally conclude the paper in Section 7, discussing possibilities for further improvement
and research on the topic.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Principal Agent Theory in Other Sports
The proper alignment of incentives in principal-agent relationships is a long-studied issue
in economics, particularly within the sports and labor economic fields. Since the inception
of the principal-agent theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976), there have been numerous
studies on worker productivity in relation to their offered wages, with a new emphasis on
professional athletes. The seminal paper was done by Berri and Krautmann (2006) where
they used two different dependent variables to measure player performance, and found a
negative relationship between contract length and player performance within Major League
Baseball.
There have also been research conducted on basketball data. Stiroh (2007) studied the
effect of pay on performance in the NBA. He found that performance improves significantly
in the year before a multi-year contract is signed, and declines after the contract is signed.
Stiroh excludes players with one-year contracts from his analysis to avoid competing incentive
effects because players with one-year contracts are typically marginal players or players
near the end of the career. Using weighted-least squares, the study finds that players with
better performance receive longer contracts with higher salaries. When examining individual
performance and contract status, Stiroh finds that there is improvement in the year before
signing a large contract, and slight evidence post-contract decline in performance. This
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paper will follow a similar methodology expects to find congenial results.
Purcell (2009) found that performance levels declined among players in the first year,
but noticed an increase in final year performance. Purcell (2009) says players would reduce
effort because of the lack of incentives. She also stated that there would be a slight increase
in player production in the final year of a contract, as players may compete harder and play
at a higher level to secure a new contract. This major contract year creates an incentive for
players to begin the season in their best physical and mental state and to maximize effort
to perform to have a high performing year and to capitalize on the market. However, this
is a highly individualized issue and one which aligns to professionalism and sportsmanship,
thus it depends on human nature. Krautmann (1990, 1993) and Gannon (2009) found that
in baseball players, there was no evidence of players adjusting their effort level in hopes of
signing a big contract. This paper expects a similar situation occurs in NHL.
A more recent paper by Paulsen (2019) showed new evidence of shirking in Major League
Baseball. That study specifically identified and analyzed the causal relationship between
player performance and years remaining on a player’s contract using a fixed-effects regression
strategy to address the positive selection into multi-year agreements. Paulsen not only found
further evidence of a negative relationship between contract length and player performance,
but he also claimed that this is not due to the widely held belief of shirking as others claim
it to be (Lehn 1982, Krautmann 2009). Instead, he suggests that there are alternative
explanations for why player performance may vary throughout the duration of a contract
other than shirking, such as adjustments to signing with a new team. However, there is the
obvious complication, as these previous works are all centered around the sport of baseball
and the MLB, but this paper focuses on the effects within the National Hockey League.
2.2 Research in the NHL
One of the major drawbacks of the other papers was that player performance is calculated
very differently in the NHL. For that, the two papers by Chan, Cho, and Novati (2012)
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and Gramacy, Taddy, and Tian (2016) help quantify the performance of NHL players to
their individual marginal effects, as well as their overall team’s performance. Chan et. al
first categorized each player into a distinct type (goalies, defensemen, or forwards) using
a k-means clustering algorithm, and then modeled the relationship between player type to
team performance using a multiple linear regression. From there, they were also able to
calculate the so-called "economic burden" that each player contributed to his team’s salary
cap using the results of the regression analysis. This paper was helpful in discussing ways
to differentiate between the different positions in hockey, but failed to pinpoint each player’s
individual effect.
In the third study, Gramacy, Taddy, and Tian used regularized logistic regression to
calculate the marginal effect of each player’s performance, thereby limiting the confounding
influence of the other players that he is playing with and against. The study allows for
better measurements of player ability compared to the classic plus-minus statistics, and
has the added benefit of being interpretable on the same scale as plus-minus. A limitation
of Gramacy et al (2015) is that it ignores typical shot-based metrics like Corsi-PPF and
PPM values for goalies and instead measure goalie performance the same as a defense-men
rather than a separate category. Furthermore, due to historical rule changes in the NHL,
the overtime is no longer measured using 5-on-5 Corsi but rather a modified 3-on-3 Corsi.
However it does mention that Points per Game is amenable as a simpler measurement of
player performance for skaters.
The focus of my research will primarily be on synthesizing and building around the
methods of Stiroh (2007) and Berri et al (2006), to arrive at a more effective method of de-
termining the presence of strategic behavior in the context of NHL player contracts. Using
aspects from the empirical model of Landry et al (2014) I hope to measure player perfor-
mance at a more individual level as the response variable for this study. Then, in order to
determine whether or not sufficient evidence exists to support the hypothesis that players
engage in strategic behavior, I will use a combination of ordinary least squares regressions
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using different outcome variables to evaluate playing-time adjusted player performance. Ev-
idence should then exist for whether or not the “contract curse” phenomenon, also known as
ex ante strategic behavior, does exist.
3 Theoretical Model
Based on the previous work discussed in the Literature Review, it can be seen that there
may be evidence of shirking in a number of forms and studies. While Krautmann (2009)
indicated that there was no statistically significant evidence of shirking in the first year of a
contract, there may be value in looking at the following years of a long term contract.
The following hypotheses are therefore founded on the concept of shirking and on the
nature of contracts offered to NHL players. While it is recognized that financial incentives
are important (Meckling 1976), other factors should also be taken into consideration. Factors
such as an increase in a player’s time on the ice, or a player playing with a prominent scorer
could lead to increasing the potential visibility and performance of their contribution to the
team. While this measure is subjective, it could be a driver for improving performance in
the later years of a contract as the player seeks to improve upon their contract value. These
contentions form the basis of the following hypotheses as an extension of the work of Kraut-
mann (2009) in the terms of a principal-agent problem. There are four outcomes/hypotheses
to test:
• Hypothesis 1: The more a player gets paid, and the longer the contract, the more their
performance diminishes.
• Hypothesis 2: The type of contract a player signs correlates to performance level.
• Hypothesis 3: The longer the length of the contract, the more potential there is for a
decrease in performance level.
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• Hypothesis 4: A player’s performance increases in the last year of a contract and
decreases in the first year of signing.
Additionally, it would be worthwhile to note that due to the inherent differences between
the various sports as well as the degree of accuracy the player performance metrics may
lend to, it is theoretically reasonable that a different result from previous studies may be
observed. Within the MLB, the result of each action can be assigned to an individual player,
and thus can capture a much more accurate picture of how much a player contributes to
his team. In the NBA, there is the Player Efficiency Rating (PER) metric, which measures
player performance on a per-minute productivity basis and comprises of both positive and
negative accomplishments. Neither of those two metrics are perfect, but they do capture
both positive and negative contributions of a player. Raw Points and Points per Game in
hockey is simply a basic statistic that only considers the scoring metrics for a player, and
is therefore not as accurate in capturing a fuller picture of the player’s performance as a
whole. However, since scoring is certainly a major aspect of a player’s productivity, it isn’t
a completely baseless metric – it should just be noted that it might account for some of the
differences that might arise in the results.
4 Data
4.1 General Statistics
The data set was composed of 1430 unique NHL players in forward and defense positions
from 31 clubs, playing during the period 2011-2019 seasons for a total of 5288 observations. A
database was constructed with season and player performance, position, salary, and contract
were recorded. An extract of the database is shown in Figure 4. Confidence level of the
data recorded is high, as no estimations were made and all figures used were sourced from
the same raw data. Year-on-year figures are seen as comparable and, while not adjusted for
inflation, do allow for in year comparison and across year correlation or regression. A table
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of the summary statistics for the mentioned variables in the following paragraph can also be
found in the appendix.
The data that will be used for this experiment will include information about NHL player
performance for the past decade (Total Points, Goals, Assists, Time on Ice, Penalty Minutes,
etc) scraped from the NHL player statistics site, as well as biographical information (Age,
Nationality, Height, Weight, etc) from Elite Hockey Prospects and salary information (AAV
Cap hit, contract length, etc) collected from CapFriendly and EvolvingHockey.
4.2 Contract Data
Figure 1: Distribution of contract length by number of contracts signed for the 2019-2020
NHL season.
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A preliminary look at the data show that contract length has a highly right skewed data,
while the distribution for signing age is mostly normal (aside from the entry-level contracts
from 17-18 year olds, which won’t be used in the analysis), with the highest peak at age 26.
The distribution of the contract length implies there might be an inherent selection bias as
highly talented players with high ability will be offered high contract lengths. This will be
mitigated by using a fixed effect model controlling for ability later on. The figure only shows
the distribution for the 2019-2020 NHL season, as players often repeat season-to-season with
similar distributions, so only the most recent season was used to display the general spread.
Figure 2: Distribution of signing age by number of contracts signed for the 2019-2020 season
in the NHL.
11
Another point of interest is that contracts can be split into 3 separate ranges: entry
level contracts, which only take up less than 5% of the cap hit for a team’s salary, the RFA
contract from 5% to 10%, and long range contracts that take up over 10% of the team’s cap
hit salary.
Two separate data sets will be used for the construction of the empirical model. Player
performance statistics were gathered from EliteHockeyProspects. The performance metric
being used will be Points and Points per Game for forwards and defense-men. Contract
data was also collected from a hockey salary database, CapFriendly. The contract variables
utilized are the average annual value of the contract (Log(Salary), contract terms (Length),
and a dummy variable that is 1 if a player received a new long-term (greater than one year)
contract in that certain season (Contract Year). All contract variables are valued at 0 if a
player did not receive a new contract in that given season.
5 Empirical Model
If shirking were prevalent, there would be a negative effect of the contract dummy variable
on productivity (Berri and Krautmann 2006). If shirking occurred as a result of receiving a
long-term contract, we would expect to find that productivity falls as the AAV or the length
of the contract increases.
In order to understand the model adopted for this research, the starting point is to
clarify the perspective taken for the principal-agent model forming the basis of the analysis.
Contract monitoring was seen as the closest fit for NHL player performance modeling and
allowed for the capture of salary to effort and concepts of shirking, linked to contracts offered.
As such, contract monitoring forms the basis of the principal-agent model adopted where the
player is the principal and the team is the agent. Using this model, the dependent variables
for our study were identified as Points (P) and Points per Game (P/GP) for each individual
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player. Additional independent variables were used, to arrive at the initial equation of
P = β0 + β1Age+ β2Length+ β3First+ β4Last+ β5Fraction
+ β6Log(Salary) + β7Log(Salary)
2 + β8Position+ β9Age
2 + β10GP + β11Team (1)
Where Age is the age of the player at the start of the NHL season. This term was then
squared to account for the peak age of performance (Age2). Controlling for normalized age
controls for both the deteriorating effects of aging, as well as the beneficial effects of gaining
experience (Garner et al. 2016). The term of contract is measured in Length. The term
Fraction is used to denote proportion of the contract that has been completed. The change in
games played from season to season was also measured (GP). A decrease in games played is
associated with an increase in injuries, which results in a net reduction in productivity (Berri
and Krautmann 2006). The NHL lockout year (2012-2013) was discarded for its shortened
season.
In order to control for team quality, NHL team rankings were used, based on the final
standings of points earned at the end of the season. These rankings are on a scale of 1 to
31, where 1 is the best team and 31 is the worst team. To measure the change in team
quality, team ranking in the first year was subtracted from team ranking in the second
year (Team). A negative sign on the coefficient of this variable would mean that player
performance decreases when a player is on a worse team. The salaries were also re-scaled
logarithmically as a way to account for the heavy positive skewness of the variable.
The final control variables are a set of dummy positional variables. First is a dummy
variable for whether or not the contract is in it’s first season of term, and Last measures
the same but for the last season. The positions used were split into 2 categories: forwards
(any center, left winger, or right winger) and defense-men. Goalies were not included in this
study as the typical measure of player performance used are not applicable to them.
The estimated empirical model for P/GP as the dependent variable follows a similar
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equation as well, the main noted difference being GP no longer being included, thus looking
like:
P/GP = β0 + β1Age+ β2Length+ β3First+ β4Last+ β5Fraction
+ β6Log(Salary) + β7Log(Salary)
2 + β8Position+ β9Age
2 + β10Team (2)
The regressions used include both linear regression, and linear regression with an extra
random effect term to see if there is a relationship between the data variables. The co-
variance is used to tell if variables move in tandem, and it also helps determine whether
or not the variables are related to each other. From there, tests will be conducted to see
if the values are statistically significant using t-tests and probability values to ensure the
relationships are not due to chance.
However, there are underlying issues that arise from using just simple ordinary least
squares regression. Most significantly, there is the concern of not controlling for player
ability. Talented players with a greater ability will naturally get better contracts, but as
those are characteristics are typically unobserved using typical player performance metrics, it
is difficult to fully capture and control for player ability. It could be possible that unobserved
player ability is correlated with contract length, meaning that players of varying ability levels
in our sample would exhibit systematic differences in their contract characteristics. This
type of systematic variation might cause confounding results for whether or it is possible to
attribute changes in player performance solely to time left within a contract.
Thankfully, the data set used contains multiple observations for players from season to
season. With that panel data, it is now possible to specify fixed effects models as well.
This has the additional benefit of tackling other issues of endogeneity, such as eliminating
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities such as weight, height, draft rank, etc. It will be
marked with αi, to denote the fixed effects controlling for the unobserved individual ability,
as seen below:
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P = β0 + β1Age+ β2Length+ β3First+ β4Last+ β5Fraction
+ β6Log(Salary) + β7Log(Salary)
2 + β8Position+ β9Age
2
+ β10GP + β11Team+ αi + αc
(3)
Where αc denotes the different controls used in the fixed effects models. Furthermore, a
fixed effects model is used rather than difference in differences as the data doesn’t necessarily
fit into a binary treatment and control group stratification. The ’plm’ package in R Studio
was used to run all the specified models for panel data and to make robust inferences.
6 Results
Table 1 indicates a positive relationship across games played, contract length, first year of
contract, and Log(salary). This would seem to indicate that the performance of players does
increase with salary in particular in situations where longer contracts are offered. As may
be expected, points scored increases with the more games played but age has little impact
(which is exemplified by the high p-value), leading to caution in interpretation of the result.
Other variables like Team, Position, and (Age2) were also found to be insignificant, which is
why they are not included in the table.
The same regression is run again for Points per Game and lead to the results in Table
2. The table indicates that they arrive at values similar to those in Table 1. There is
however a notable difference in the p-value of 0.789 for Age and a greater emphasis on
Log(salary) to points scored. Others results are much in line with the previous table. The
Games Played variable was removed, as P/GP already takes the number of games into
consideration. Using P/GP as the performance metric rather than Points leads to a greater
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Table 1: Results of First Regression using Points and including all contracts. No team

























Using 2011-2018 data, ignoring the values from the lockout year, totalling at 5438 observations. R-Squared
was 0.307, Adjusted R-Squared was 0.126. The statistics derived from robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively
R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared value, and will be used in the following fixed effects
models.
Table 3 details the results of the fixed effect model, in addition to the other various re-
gressions with different variables and controls. Column (1) is the full model that includes
all the variables from the best performing model in Table 2. The results of the first column
once again seem to support the hypothesis that players increase their performance in the
first season. Looking closer, we see that the coefficient on the First year variable is positive
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Table 2: Results of First Regression using Points per Game and including all contracts. No























Using 2011-2018 data, ignoring the values from the lockout year, totalling at 5438 observations. R-Squared
was 0.422, Adjusted R-Squared was 0.279. The statistics derived from robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively
and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. While this goes against the standard belief in
traditional principal-agent situations that state shirking would occur after signing a guar-
anteed contract, this can be explained. Berri and Krautmann believed that teams take into
consideration a player’s potential for improvement when signing players, and would hope for
an increase in productivity following the signing of a new contract. Furthermore, it intu-
itively makes sense that a player might want to perform well after signing a new contract.
Barring the exceptions of those on the brink of retirement, most athletes have to consider
the impact that shirking might have on their reputation and value for future signings.
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Table 3: Results of Fixed Effect Models using Points per Game Played as the Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Full Model Contract Length Only Age Only Team Control
(Intercept) 3.152 4.386 6.980 4.579
(7.144) (6.089) (5.910) (5.112)
Age 0.987* 1.074** 0.876*
(0.452) (0.468) (0.392)
Age2 -0.020** -0.018** -0.020**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Length 3.236 2.002* 3.692*
(3.202) (1.195) (2.195)
First 0.684*** 0.685*** 0.667*** 0.649**
(0.202) (0.202) (0.195) (0.201)
Last 0.303* 0.288* 0.292* 0.282*







Team controls No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.198 0.105 0.079 0.170
Adjusted R-Squared 0.107 0.062 0.060 0.077
Using 2011-2018 data, ignoring the values from the lockout year. The statistics derived from robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p
< 0.01 respectively
It is interesting to see the difference between the fixed effect models compared to the OLS
models. For the most part, the results fall in line comparably. The signs of the coefficients
remain consistent, aside from the sign change for Age2, which will be explained below. It
can also be observed that the significance of certain variables diminish moving from the OLS
to the fixed effects model. It makes sense that salary does not have as large of an effect
on player performance at an individual level, as the salary likely stays constant for a player
for the years of the contract. On the other hand, Age variables become more significant at
the player level, and it is reasonable that a player’s age would cause a larger impact on his
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performance.
In the next few columns, various controls were analyzed, including age, contract length,
and team effects. The reasoning behind this for age and contract length was that perhaps
age had its own effect on player productivity outside of affecting the type of contract that
is signed. While younger players are given shorter, entry-level contracts and older players
garner a greater number of the lengthier contracts, a player’s age could also attribute to their
playing style and experience, and should be separated from length and contract. This allows
for more specific insight on each of the variables’ individual effects on player performance. It
was found that Age did not have strong statistical significance, but Age2 did. This suggests
that there indeed is a negative, parabolic relationship regarding player performance and age.
Despite the physicality of the sport, the average age of NHL athletes is higher than most
other professional sports (Table 5). Nevertheless, the natural progression and decay of the
body will ultimately overpower the benefits gained from experience, leading to a decrease in
player performance, and explaining the negative coefficient for Age2. The last column tested
for whether or not team controls affected player performance, and found that there was no
significant effect.
Next, interaction terms were taken into consideration in Table 4. This was done to reveal
any compounded effects of Length and Age on the player performance in the first and last
years of a contract that might not have been picked up on in previous models. For example,
a player with a 10-year contract might have more incentive to shirk off in the first year than
a player with only a two-year deal, and a player currently with a shorter term contract might
be more willing to work harder at the last year of a deal to ensure a better contract in the
following season. The same reasoning can be applied to age as well; older players might
see a greater decrease in player performance in the first year as they likely have already
signed large contracts, whereas younger players might not have the luxury of taking it easier
during the first year of a new contract. However in all cases, it is found that there are no
statistically significant coefficients. There is no evidence to be gathered from the results that
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age or contract length has the effect of making a player more predisposed to change their
performance in the first or last season.
Table 4: Results of Fixed Effect Models using Points per Games Played as the Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Base Model First x Length Last x Length First x Age Last x Age
(Intercept) 2.209 2.344 2.093 1.982 1.908
(2.337) (2.402) (3.641) (3.595) (3.695)
Age 1.091*** 1.969*** 2.628*** 2.273*** 2.673
(0.327) (0.402) (0.641) (0.595) (0.695)
Age2 0.372 0.244 0.703 0.432 0.539
(0.227) (0.302) (0.641) (0.795) (0.795)
Length 9.236* 2.002 5.724 4.394* 5.394
(7.992) (2.348) (5.349) (4.001) (5.192)
First 4.349 1.082 4.153 3.902 3.023
(2.293) (2.923) (3.929) (3.682) (3.293)
Last 4.177 1.628 2.688 3.006 3.291
(4.135) (2.001) (3.012) (3.284) (3.482)
Fraction 0.169 0.531* 0.270 0.284 0.230
(0.173) (0.270) (0.283) (0.281) (0.284)
Log(Salary) 0.233*** 0.214*** 0.202*** 0.197*** 0.199***
(0.0382) (0.0433) (0.0399) (0.0411) (0.0400)
Log(Salary2) 0.185 -0.308 -0.861*** -0.732*** - 0.913***
(0.225) (0.221) (0.240) (0.266) (0.249)
First x Length -0.027
(0.093)
Last x Length -0.064
(0.093)
First x Age 0.021
(0.033)
Last x Age -0.009
(0.012)
R-Squared 0.213 0.168 0.170 0.177 0.199
Adjusted R-Squared 0.107 0.096 0.070 0.077 0.099
Using 2011-2018 data, ignoring the values from the lockout year. The statistics derived from robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses and the fixed effects regression models include team controls. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively
The paper ultimately did not find results similar to those conducted in other sports, like
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the NBA. Stiroh (2007) had initially concluded that performance would increase the year
prior to signing a contract, but found that there was no change in player performance follow-
ing the signing. Results from this study found that performance is generally higher in the
first year of a contract, once it is adjusted for the fact that performance sometimes decreases
with age. Because age was controlled for, this phenomenon of increased performance prior
to major contracts was no longer observed.
It is also significant because it contradicts Purcell’s (2009) study that examines the
principal-agent problem within professional sport long-term contracts. Instead of finding
that players decreased their performance after signing a major contract that first year, the
results showed that players increased their performance, just not to the same level as the
first year. This could possibly be due to the inner mentality of a player determined to prove
their worth, or simply that the teams struck a good deal with the player and adequately
measured their expected performance when penning a contract.
The differences in these finding can also be attributed to the inherent nature of the two
sports. Basketball is more and more becoming a position-less sport, whereas hockey has more
rigid structures in place for forwards and defensemen. Furthermore, as previously discussed
in the theoretical model, there are differences in the accuracy of the player performance met-
rics. PER gives a slightly more well-rounded measurement with both positive and negative
accomplishments by a player, whereas Points per Game is simply a rate of the scoring done
by a player. These inconsistencies could lead to disparate outcomes.
In summary, there is not much evidence of added incentive in the sense that players do not
suddenly increase their performance in the last year of a contract compared to the first year.
The models indicate that the first year of contract provides a degree of performance which
gradually decreases once contracts have been obtained. The performance then improves on
previous years into the final year of a contract but still not to the level of a first year contract.
This is the essence of the principal agent problem and could possibly pose as an issue for
General Managers and coaches in the NHL.
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7 Conclusion
This paper sought to explore the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and
incentive structure, and see whether or not the worry of a contract curse held any validity.
It hoped to highlight where the principal-agent problem occurs. Based on the findings, there
might be evidence for a principal-agent problem in the NHL.
The hypotheses from the theoretical model section can each be revisited to confirm the
validity of each statement based on the findings from our empirical specifications:
• Hypothesis 1: The more a player gets paid, the more their performance diminishes.
– True. From Figures 6 and 7 in the appendix, this can be observed to be true.
While the baseline performances tend to be higher for those with longer, better
contracts, it tends to decrease a greater amount that those that sign only entry-
level contracts.
• Hypothesis 2: The type of contract a player signs correlates to performance level.
– True. This can also be observed to be true from Figures 6 and 7. The performance
of a player tends to increase with the salary, but this correlation diminishes at the
highest salaries. Restricted Free Agents are found to have the biggest variation
compared to the other contract types.
• Hypothesis 3: The longer the length of the contract, the more potential there is for a
decrease in performance level.
– True. A player’s production is expected to decrease slightly over the life of a
contract (both total years and fraction years).
• Hypothesis 4: A player’s performance increases in the last year of a contract and
decreases in the first year of signing.
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– False. This is one of the biggest findings of the paper. Player performance is found
to actually be higher in the first year of a contract, by controlling and adjusting
for the fact that performance decreases with age. However, it is true that there is
a slight increase in the last year of a contract, but not enough to offset the general
decline in performance.
It makes sense that the contracts of most concern would be for the Restricted Free Agents
or long-term contracts that take players past their playing prime (past 27, into their thirties).
Safer contracts like entry-level contracts or short-term contracts are good for both teams and
players because they provide incentive to perform and a reduction of risk to the team should
a player not perform to expectations. The same can be said for players at the other end
of the spectrum. Although not typically used much, performance bonuses for players over
the age of 35 allows clubs to go after what previously might’ve been thought of as a risky
consideration. These findings, therefore, provide contributions to the practicing managers
and coaches of NHL teams who can consider the results to help shape their approach to
management of players and the planning of teams and succession planning for talent.
Future recommendations, therefore, would include reduced terms and salaries paid to
players for greater balance to the principal and agent, by incentivizing players pursuing
their second contract to improve their longevity of performance (and effort). Incentives like
bonus money could realign commitment between the team and the player. Of course, these
suggestions would not be taken lightly by the National Hockey League’s Player Association,
as they will understandably try to gain the greatest amount of payment possible for their
labor, as well as a guarantee for stability in a city. However, this would realign the principal
with agent and encourage the players to continue to perform throughout the contract term.
In addition, it is recognized that there are a number of issues impacting upon this area
and that with something as complex as team performance then a range of factors are impor-
tant and can impact upon the issues identified in this paper. Future pathways for additional
research will include explorations of the views of managers and senior stakeholders in the
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game relative to the principle-agent issue. Some more subjective data, including confiden-
tiality practices, could also be collected in order to explore the issue of trust in principal
agent relationships. That is an area where the opportunism of some agents can have an
impact upon an athlete’s performance (Mason 2001) and influence their productivity on the
ice. It is of importance because if general managers of teams expect that professional athletes
will shirk after signing long-term contracts, they can implement incentive mechanisms in the
contracts in order to prevent shirking.
The finding that players might reduce effort after signing a long-term contract should be
of interest to other types of firms as well. In sports, it is relatively easy to measure individual
performance through performance statistics. However, in other professions, such as teaching,
it is much harder to measure individual performance. Employers are not able to monitor
effort as effectively, and therefore face a moral hazard problem. Employees are paid to do a
certain job, but since employers are not always able to monitor effort, they are often able to
shirk. While elsewhere this may not be able to be measured empirically, this study suggests
that this is what occurs, particularly in the domain of hockey.
Ultimately this paper has applied research from previous contributions with more recent
data and additional applications with regards to hockey in particular. The composite result
is a more holistic understanding of the principal agent problem in NHL and potential for
further areas of study. In addition to extending the study of principal agent issues in NHL,
the research also highlighted the increased interest of sport economics and the wide varieties
of applications sports data can contribute to.
24
8 Bibliography
1. Bent, D. P., Sommers, P. M. (2014). Pay and Performance in the National Hockey
League, 2011-2012. Atlantic Economic Journal, 42(1), 109-110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-
013-9389-8
2. Chan, T. C. Y., Cho, J. A., Novati, D. C. (2012a). Quantifying the Con-
tribution of NHL Player Types to Team Performance. Interfaces, 42(2), 131-145.
https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.1110.0612
3. Depken, C. A., Lureman, J. (2018). WAGE DISPARITY, TEAM PERFOR-
MANCE, AND THE 2005 NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT:WAGE
DISPARITY AND TEAM PERFORMANCE. Contemporary Economic Policy, 36(1),
192-199. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12220
4. Gramacy, R. B., Taddy, M., Tian, S. (2016). Hockey Player Performance via Reg-
ularized Logistic Regression. ArXiv:1510.02172 [Stat]. http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.02172
5. Jones, J. C. H., Nadeau, S., Walsh, W. D. (1997). The wages of sin: Employ-
ment and salary effects of violence in the national hockey league. Atlantic Economic
Journal, 25(2), 191-206. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298385 Kahane, L. H. (n.d.).
Team and player eVects on NHL player salaries: A hierarchical linear model approach.
4.
6. Landry, J., Edgar, D., Harris, J., Grant, K. (2015a). National Hockey League
guaranteed contracts: A principal agent problem impacting on performance. Man-
agement Research Review, 38(12), 1306-1330. https://doi.org/10.1108/MRR-06-2014-
0146
7. Mason, D. S., Foster, W. M. (2007). Putting Moneyball on Ice? Purcell, E. A.
R. (n.d.). Long-Term Contracts and the Principal-Agent Problem. 24.
25
8. Purcell, E. (2009), âLong term contracts and the principal agent problemâ, The
Gettysburg Economic Review, Vol. 3, pp. 45-66.
9. Jensen, M.C. and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305â360.
10. Sannikov, Y. (2008), ”A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem",
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 75, pp. 957-984.
11. Stiroh, Kevin J. (2007) "Playing for Keeps: Pay and Performance in the NBA." Eco-
nomic Inquiry 45, no. 1 2007: 145-61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00004.x
26
9 Appendix
Additional figures, graphs, and tables included below, including summary statistics, corre-
lation matrix, and data extract samples.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for dataset based on 722 regular roster players from the NHL
during the 2018-2019 season.
Variable Type Summary
Team Character Unique values: 31
Age Integer Min: 18
Mean: 25.94
Max: 41






Position Character D: 232
Forward: 391
Goalies: 99
Games Played Integer Min: 20
Mean: 62.41
Max: 84
Goals Integer Min: 0
Mean: 11.41
Max: 51
Assists Integers Min: 0
Mean: 18.59
Max: 87
Points Integer Min: 0
Mean: 29.73
Max: 128
Contract Type Character 1-way: 534
Entry-level: 150
2-way: 38






AAV Integers Min: 625000
Mean: 3065363
Max: 159000000




Figure 3: Distribution of cap hit percentage (of single team) by contract length for the
2019-2020 NHL season.
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Figure 4: An overview of quantitative variables used within the data set. Includes all 5288
observations for the 2011-2018 season in the NHL.
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Figure 5: An extract from the data set containing information for 1430 NHL players from
the 2011-2018 seasons.
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Figure 6: Distribution of all signed contracts by logged salary against the player performance
(measured by P/GP) in the NHL from the 2011-2018 seasons.
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Figure 7: Distribution of all signed contracts by logged salary against the player performance
(measured by P/GP) in the NHL from the 2011-2018 seasons, grouped by signing type. Light
blue indicates entry-level contracts, magenta indicates first major signing at 25, and all other
signings indicated in darker blue.
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